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light of the newly found illegality of private discrimination, some toughen-
ing of present federal regulations regarding construction financing62 can
be expected.
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. will, of course, draw no commendation
from those who judge a decision by the degree of judicial restraint
therein. Yet, the realization that it goes far to attack that which spawns
segregated housing-so debilitating to the Negro and his quest for
equality-earns for this case a mark high in "the jurisprudence of a
nation striving to rejoin the human race."6
MARTIN ENGELS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATE INTERFERENCE WITH
PRIVATE, CONSENSUAL MARITAL SEXUAL RELATIONS
Cotner pleaded guilty to his wife's charge that he had committed "the
abominable and detestable crime against nature"' with her2 in violation
of the Indiana sodomy statute.3 Neither the wife's affidavit nor the statute
provide for compensatory damages-which is true for § 1982-prevented a court from award-
ing them.
62. E.g., 24 C.F.R. § 200.315 (1968) (FHA); 38 C.F.R. § 36.4331 (1968) (VA).
63. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 88 S. Ct. 2186, 2208 n.6 (1968) (Douglas, J. con-
curring).
1. The "crime against nature" in more common parlance is termed "sodomy."
Sodomy historically and medically refers to anal intercourse, or buggery, but the
statutes on sodomy include all manner of sexual activity conceived by someone,
somewhere, at one time or another, to be "unnatural"; and this means, of course, in
this sexually repressed society, almost every variety of sexual activity other than
"natural" coitus. Sodomy laws thus cover, in one state or another, not only buggery,
but fellatio (oral-genital contact with the male), cunnilingus (oral-genital contact
with the female), homosexual behavior, bestiality (sex contact with animals),
necrophilia (sexual contact with the dead) and even mutual masturbation. Hefner,
The Legal Enforcement of Morality, 40 U. CoLo. L. REV. 199, 210 (1968) (footnotes omitted).
In Fine v. State, 153 Fla. 297, 300, 14 So.2d 408, 409 (1943), the Supreme Court of
Florida lamented that:
We have experienced some difficulty in determining precisely what unnatural
sexual acts do, and what do not constitute the crime. This is largely due to the
reluctance legal authors have shown to detail the facts they were considering, be-
cause they are always so shocking. This aversion was voiced by Blackstone in his
Commentaries over one hundred and fifty years ago: "I will not act so disagreeable
a part, to my readers as well as myself, as to dwell any longer upon a subject the
very mention of which is a disgrace to human nature." A similar attitude has been
expressed about even particularizing in the formal charge ....
For general understanding of sodomy laws, see Comment, Sodomy Statutes-A Need for
Change, 13 S.D.L. REV. 384 (1968); Hefner, The Legal Enforcement of Morality, supra, at
210-20; Note, Sodomy-Crime or Sin?, 12 U. FLA. L. REV. 83 (1959); and Spence, The Law
of Crime Against Nature, 32 N.C.L. REV. 312 (1954).
2. The court held that he had standing to complain of unconstitutional state invasion of
marital privacy even though his wife was the complainant. Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873,
875 n.2 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 37 U.S.L.W. 3123 (1968).
3. BURNS' IND. STAT. ch. 169, § 10-4221 (1965), quoted id. at n.3. The Florida statute,
FLA. STAT. § 800.01 (1967), is substantially similar. Other Florida statutes prohibit "any un-
natural and lascivious act," FLA. STAT. § 800.02 (1967), lewd and lascivious behavior, FLA.
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mentioned the use of force, and no Indiana courts had construed the sta-
tute as requiring force.4 Cotner later filed a petition for habeas corpus in a
federal district court, challenging the statute as unconstitutionally vague5
and his conviction as an unconstitutional invasion of his right of marital
privacy. The petition was dismissed for failure to exhaust state remedies
and for lack of merit.' On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit, held, reversed: Absent a clear showing of a com-
pelling state interest, as through proof of use of force, a criminal sodomy
statute is constitutionally inapplicable to private, consensual physical rela-
tions between married persons. Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir.
1968).7
STAT. § 798.02 (1967), the exposure of sexual organs in a vulgar or indecent manner, FLA.
STAT. § 800.03 (1967), lewd, lascivious or indecent assaults upon a child, FLA. STAT. § 800.04
(1967), as well as various other sexually related offenses such as living in open adultery, FLA.
STAT. § 798.01 (1967), and fornication, FLA. STAT. § 798.03 (1967). See generally 81 C.J.S.
Sodomy (1953).
4. A reading of the basis for Cotner's release by the court of appeals at first blush would
recall Robert Browning's observation of reaches occasionally exceeding their grasp. The
Indiana courts had no opportunity at all to construe any force requirement under the statute
as applied to Cotner, a problem engendered by the apparent lack of state post-conviction
remedies following a plea of guilty. [Such a plea can be attacked in Florida. See Note,
22 U. Mi.mi L. REV. 187 (1967).]
The lack of a state construction of the statute as applied to Cotner led to some am-
biguity in the court's holding, in that the conviction ostensibly was vacated as based on a
plea of guilty made without full understanding of the charge because the "substantial ques-
tion later revealed by Griswold [v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)], whether certain acts
by married people with mutual consent can constitutionally be prohibited by the state," 394
F.2d at 876, was contained neither in the statute, the wife's affidavit, nor the charge. See
note 6 infra.
5. The court of appeals did not consider the claim of vagueness, although a charge of
commission of a "crime against nature" would appear to be patently vague and ambiguous.
Strangely enough, courts have upheld such statutes over a charge of vagueness, even in a
case in which the charge contained Latin phrasesI See English v. State, 122 Fla. 77, 164 So.
848 (1935). Apparently, then, the "crime against nature," whatever acts it contemplates (see
note 1 supra), is akin to obscenity, which cannot be defined but is known when seen, or the
fog, which can be seen but not grabbed. It is suggested that the crime is susceptible of explicit
definition and should not be so vaguely charged. Murder and maim are not particularly
delicate offenses, yet elaborations upon them have not been considered to have soiled the
statute books.
6. The problem of exhaustion of state remedies was magnified by the statement of the
Indiana Supreme Court in Koepke v. Hill, 157 Ind. 172, 178, 60 N.E. 1039, 1041 (1901), in
which the court observed that "[i]f a federal question were duly presented, we would be
constrained to follow the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States." Although
the district court held that under Pritchard v. State, 246 Ind. 671, 210 N.E.2d 372 (1965),
Cotner could have presented his claim for relief to the state courts by a motion to vacate
the sentence, the court of appeals held that such a motion must be presented within term
time, which here had expired, under Snow v. State, 245 Ind. 423, 199 N.E.2d 469 (1964).
Although this allowed the court of appeals to reach its determination of the merits of Cotner's
claim, it resulted in the court's opinion in some respects appearing to be more a lecture than
a holding. See note 4 supra.
The dissenting judge disagreed with the majority on the question of exhaustion, be-
lieving that state remedies were or would have been available. 394 F.2d at 876 (Duffy, J.,
dissenting). See also Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 5-7, Henry v. Cotner, petition for
cert. filed, 37 U.S.L.W. 3097 (U.S. July 28, 1968) (No. 342), cert. denied, 37 U.S.L.W. 3123
(1968).
7. Petition for cert. filed, 37 U.S.L.W. 3097 (U.S. July 28, 1968) (No. 342), cert. denied,
CASES NOTED
Decisions of the United States Supreme Court "suggest that specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations
from those guarantees that help give them life and substance."8 Drifting
from these evanescent irradiations is the right of marital privacy, a right
within the ambit of protection of the fourteenth amendment. The release
of Charles 0. Cotner marks the first faltering step since Griswold v. Con-
necticut' in the development of a meaningful right of general privacy, a
right at times conspicuously absent in this, "the land of the free."
In Griswold the Supreme Court held that criminal sanctions may not
permissibly be imposed upon the use of birth control devices by married
couples. Although there is no explicit constitutional guaranty of a right of
marital privacy, the Court reasoned that such a right is penumbral to the
freedoms by the first, third, fourth and fifth amendments, buttressed by
the ninth amendment." The combination of these creates a constitution-
ally protected zone of individual privacy and private associations."
"The import of the Griswold decision is that private, consensual,
marital relations are protected from regulation by the state through the
use of a criminal penalty,"' 2 and the import of Cotner v. Henry could well
37 U.S.L.W. 3123 (1968). For other cases involving prosecutions for sodomy between husband
and wife, see Regina v. Jellyman, 8 Carr. & Payne 604, 173 Eng. Rep. 637 (1838); Mahone
v. State, -Ala. App.-, 209 So.2d 435 (1968); Smith v. State, 150 Ark. 265, 234 S.W. 32
(1921); and Commonwealth v. Schiff, 29 Northampton County (Pa.) Rep. 283 (1944).
8. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
9. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
10. The ninth amendment states that "[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." The con-
curring opinion of Mr. Justice Goldberg in Griswold placed a great deal of emphasis upon
the ninth amendment, although the opinion of the Court used it primarily as reinforcement
for its conclusion that a right of marital privacy is constitutionally protected. See Beaney,
The Griswold Case and the Expanding Right to Privacy, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 979 (1966);
Comment, The Bedroom Should Not Be Within the Province of the Law, 4 CAmIF. W.L. REV.
115 (1968); Comment, Private Consensual Adult Behavior: The Requirement oj Harm to
Others in the Enforcement of Morality, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 581, 602-603 (1967); Kelsey,
The Ninth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, 11 IND. L.J. 309 (1936); B.B. PATTErSON,
THE FORGOTTEN NiNTH AMENDMENT (1955); and Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights . . .
Retained by the People"?, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV. 787 (1962).
11. The principles underlying the Supreme Court's decisions prior to Griswold implied
that a more basic right, a right of individual privacy, is inherent in the protections afforded
the individual in the first and fifth amendments and the home in the third and fourth. See,
e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (freedom of association and individual priv-
acy) ; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (right to educate one's children as
.one chooses) ; and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (right to study the German
language in a private school). The underlying basic right which the Court recognized in
Griswold is that of individual privacy and freedom. 381 U.S. at 482-86. See Beaney, supra
note 10. The Griswold decision belatedly has given constitutional underpinnings to the right
of privacy, a right first postulated in 1890. See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,
4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890).
12. Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873, 875 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 37 U.S.L.W. 3123
(1968).
This quotation is hardly surprising, for even before Griswold it was noted that the Su-
preme Court "could hold that the Ninth and Tenth Amendments reserve to a married couple
the right to maintain the intimacy of the marital relationship without governmental inter-
ference . . . ." Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights ... Retained by the People"?, 37 N.Y.U.L.
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be the beginning of a trend toward the protection of private, non-marital
sexual relations between consenting adults. 13 To extend the right of pri-
vacy to aberrational sexual conduct, such as homosexuality, in areas out-
side the marital bedroom would not be a particularly unusual result.14 To
REV. 787, 809 (1962). In discussing the Colorado sodomy statute, CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-2-31 (1963), in the light of Griswold, it was noted that:
This statute does not exclude commission of the crime by persons married to each
other. However, unless an apparently unnatural act were to take place in the view
of others, in which case it would fall within the "open lewdness" statute [COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-9-15 (1963)], its enforcement might well constitute an inter-
ference with marital privacy equivalent to that held violative of the Constitution on
due process grounds in Griswold v. Connecticut. And, if it were held applicable to
married persons acting in private, it would likely fall under the category of one of
the more frequently violated statutes on the books. Stimmel, Criminality of Volun-
tary Sexual Acts in Colorado, 40 U. COLO. L. REV. 268, 278 (1968) (footnote omitted). See
also Beaney, The Griswold Case and the Expanding Right to Privacy, 1966 Wis. L. REV.
979 (1966); Comment, The Bedroom Should Not Be Within the Province of the Law, 4
CALIF. W.L. REV. 115 (1968); Comment, Sodomy Statutes-A Need for Change, 13 S.D.L.
REV. 384 (1968); and Comment, Private Consensual Adult Behavior: The Requirement of
Harm to Others in the Enforcement of Morality, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 581 (1967).
13. See Beaney, supra note 12; Comment, The Bedroom Should Not Be Within the
Province of the Law, supra note 12; and Redlich, supra note 12. "[Tlhe proscription of
deviate sexual behavior between consenting adults is not within the proper scope of legislative
endeavor." Comment, Deviate Sexual Behavior: The Desirability of Legislative Proscription,
30 ALBANY L. REV. 291 (1966).
14. To do so might not have any significant impact upon heterosexual mores.
The position of the criminal law as a force influencing sexual morality is not
strong. If what the psychiatrists have been telling us is correct, and it may not be
entirely accurate, the important inhibitions against unacceptable sexual behavior are
internalized in the home, during early childhood when an individual is wholly un-
aware of the criminal law . . . . Fisher, The Legacy of Freud-A Dilemma for
Handling Offenders in General and Sex Offenders in Particular, 40 U. COLO. L. REV. 242,
258 (1968) (footnote omitted). See also Comment, Deviate Sexual Behavior: The Desirability
of Legislative Proscription, 30 ALBANY L. REV. 291, 293-94 (1966) ; and Comment, Private
Consensual Adult Behavior: The Requirement of Harm to Others in the Enforcement of
Morality, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 581, 595-97 (1967).
To regulate sexual conduct which does not involve harm to others is an attempt to regu-
late morality. It should be noted that the American Law Institute "voted against including
private homosexuality not involving force, imposition or corruption of the young as an
offense in the Model Penal Code." MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.2, Status of Section (Proposed
Official Draft, 1962). The Institute's
proposal to exclude from the criminal law all sexual practices not involving force,
adult corruption of minors, or public offense is based on the following grounds. No
harm to the secular interests of the community is involved in atypical sex practice
in private between consenting adult partners. This area of private morals is the dis-
tinctive concern of spiritual authorities. . . . MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.5, Comment
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). See also M. PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THE LAW 213 (1951). It has
been suggested that a fourth consideration, protection of the family, might be included as
a harm in which there is a state interest, thus justifying laws prohibiting incest. See Note,
Deviate Sexual Behavior Under the New Illinois Criminal Code, 1965 WASH. L.Q. 220, 232-33
.(1965).
A re-examination of laws regulating sexual conduct is currently in vogue not only in
the United States but in other countries, as indicated by the Wolfenden Report in England,
GREAT BRIT. COMM. ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION REPORT, C.M.D. No. 247
(1957). Illinois has responded to the need for reform by eliminating its sodomy statute.
The existence and enforcement of this [the Illinois sodomy] statute produced sev-
eral problems: (1) a lack of notice that the conduct in a particular situation was
illegal; (2) a pattern of uneven enforcement; (3) the possibility of widespread
blackmail; (4) the creation of serious guilt feelings among persons engaging in this
behavior; and (5) a pattern of uncontrollable deviate behavior. Note, Deviate Sexual
Behavior Under the New Illinois Criminal Code, supra, at 220.
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require proof of a compelling state interest, as opposed to merely a
rational basis, in criminally proscribing conduct such as homosexual be-
havior is the next logical step, even if such activity is not "an association
for as noble a purpose as any involved in our [the Supreme Court's] prior
decisions." 15
Although both Griswold and Cotner dealt with marital privacy, the
precedents upon which the Griswold decision rested dealt with a more
general right of privacy and association. In NAACP v. Alabama"6 the
Court "protected the 'freedom to associate and privacy in one's associa-
tions,' noting that freedom of association was a peripheral First Amend-
ment right."17 It is this "freedom to associate and privacy in one's asso-
ciations" which, coupled with a right of privacy in aberrational sexual
conduct, should under the fourteenth amendment result in requiring a
compelling state interest to be shown in imposing criminal sanctions upon
private sexual conduct, inside or outside of marriage.'
This example of modern legislative acumen is not without its irony, however.
The Illinois lawmakers did remove the state's sodomy statute, but they left stand-
ing the statutes against fornication and adultery. Illinois is thus in the unique
position of permitting all so-called "perversion," both heterosexual and homosexual,
while prohibiting normal sexual intercourse.
It is obvious that we are still a very long way from establishing sane sex law
anywhere in these United States. Hefner, The Legal Enforcement of Morality, 40
U. CoLo. L. REV. 199, 221 (1968).
15. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
Regardless of their nobility of purpose, sexual offenses are common. The Kinsey Report
noted that up to 95% of the male population may at one time or another violate the law.
A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY & C. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 550-51 (1948).
Professor Ploscowe points out, however, that Kinsey's statistics are probably exaggerated
because not all states have all the laws upon which Kinsey relied. M. PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THE
LAW 137 (1951). Nonetheless, the common occurrence of violations leads to an uneven en-
forcement of the laws. "In a recent ten-year period in New York City, the only three cases
of homosexual sodomy involving female defendants were dismissed, while 'tens of thousands'
of male defendants were arrested and convicted." Comment, Deviate Sexual Behavior: The
Desirability of Legislative Proscription, 30 ALBANY L. REV. 291, 298, citing Bowman & Engle,
A Psychiatric Evaluation of Laws of Homosexuality, 29 TEMP. L.Q. 273, 281 (1956).
16. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
17. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965), quoting NAACP v. Alabama,
id. at 462.
18. A compelling state interest could be shown where the particular offense involves
force, corruption of the young or public offense. The three basic values in legislation of sexual
standards are primarily the prevention of forcible sexual relations, the protection of minors
and incompetents, and the prevention of public indecency. See Ploscowe, Report to the Hague:
Suggested Revisions of Penal Law Relating to Sex Crimes and Crimes Against the Family,
50 CORNELL L.Q. 425 (1965). See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.5, Comment (Tent. Draft
No. 4, 1956) ; M. PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THE LAW 213 (1951).
Judge Duffy in his dissent in Cotner v. Henry disagreed with the imposition of a force
requirement to show state interest, saying:
I take it that if Cotner had shot his wife in the privacy of their bedroom, the
majority of the panel which heard this appeal would not proclaim that there is a
difference between a crime committed in the bedroom and otherwise. I take it that
in such a case there would be no claim of ". . . an unwarranted invasion of marital
privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment."
394 F.2d at 876.
This statement of the judge was elaborated in the petition for certiorari by the state:
If the views of the Court of Appeals are followed, married persons would be shielded
from prosecution of an age old crime while others committing the very same activity
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXIII
Should the Supreme Court uphold or later follow Cotner, as logically
it should, the first effect probably would be upon laws prohibiting homo-
sexuality.'9 However, even regarding laws in which there is more obviously
a state interest, such as fornication and indecent exposure, the Griswold
and Cotner rationale would appear to require proof of compelling state
interest or necessity in order for convictions to be upheld." The result
may be that states will constitutionally be required to enact a penal law,
such as that proposed by the American Law Institute,"' which, with a
rational and secular basis for proscribing sex crimes in which the state has
a compelling interest, will nonetheless safeguard the right to life, libertine
and the pursuit of happiness.
R. TH omAs FARRAR
would be subject to prosecution. Following this rationale, what other crimes would
the constitutional right to privacy make inapplicable to married persons? Where
would the courts draw the line? Whether a man beats his child, a stranger or his
wife, the activity still constitutes the crime of assault and battery. Whether a man
shoots his child, a stranger or his wife, the activity still constitutes the crime of
murder. Likewise whether a man commits the crime of sodomy with a child, a
stranger or his wife, the activity still constitutes the crime of sodomy. A husband
and wife's right to privacy should not shield them from what would otherwise be
a criminal act. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 8, Henry v. Cotner, petition for
cert. filed, 37 U.S.L.W. 3097 (U.S. July 28, 1968) (No. 342).
Aside from its value as an example of a classic non sequitur, the argument points out
why the Griswold rationale should not be limited to marital privacy. Given a right of privacy,
the state should be required in its curtailment of that right to prove a compelling interest
in doing so. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481-82, the test of
the validity of the state's action cannot be that of a mere rational basis but must require
proof of a substantial interest or necessity. If there is a right, as the Court in NAACP v.
Alabama and elsewhere has indicated there is, the right should be available to all.
Not all of mankind desire or need privacy, but for those who do, a freedom to
determine the extent to which others may share in one's spiritual nature, and the
ability to protect one's beliefs, thoughts, emotions, and sensations from unreasonable
intrusions are of the very essence of life in a free society.
Beaney, The Griswold Case and the Expanding Right to Privacy, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 979,
995 (1966).
It should be noted that even between spouses, the use of force may at times be lawful,
as for example a husband's immunity from prosecution for the rape of his wife. See 44 AM.
JUR. Rape § 29 (1942). While the marriage itself may constitute an implied consent to the
use of force to achieve intercourse with a wife, a better distinction is that the force is being
used to effect a sexual relation which is approved by society. The same force used to effect
a disapproved sexual relation, as for example sodomy, could be sanctioned because force not
only debars any consensual nature of the relation but also indicates that the coerced conduct
is not that contemplated by the marriage relationship. It constitutes the act not of a married
couple to which society could imply consent, but the act of a married person.
19. See notes 14 and 15 supra.
20. The requirement that a state show a compelling interest in a particular offense would
not affect convictions involving corruption of the young, e.g., Lason v. State, 152 Fla. 440,
12 So.2d 305 (1943), or even forcible sodomy with one's wife, e.g., Mahone v. State, -Ala.-,
209 So.2d 435 (1968). See also note 7 supra. Statutes involving, for example, sexual assaults
upon a child, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 800.04 (1967), are clearly unaffected by the holding in
Cotner. However, with the advent of "the Pill," the compelling state interest in prosecutions
under fornication statutes, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 798.03 (1967), may be considerably more dif-
ficult to show.
21, MOPL PENAL CODE.
